Abstract In contrast with England and Wales, where there is a discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence, exclusion in Greece is automatic. Article 177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure mandates that evidence obtained by the commission of criminal offences is not taken into consideration. In addition, article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy. Inspired by the rigidity of these exclusionary rules, the rights-centred approach that they reflect and the context of a constitutional criminal procedure within which they apply, this article sheds light on the protection of constitutional rights as a rationale for the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. It does so against the background of the reliability-centred exclusionary doctrine in England.
The road to automatic exclusionary rules in Greece
Given that the first Arios Pagos (Cassation Court of Greece) decision prohibiting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence dates back to 1871, 7 a brief historical review is in order. Hellenic law on improperly obtained evidence has
The rise of telephone communication and greater availability of technology facilitating the covert recording of private conversations, telephone or other, in the 1950s led to an explosion in the use of covertly obtained recordings in civil and criminal trials. 14 It is at this time that Arios Pagos abandoned the rhetoric of evidential prohibitions inherent in constitutional rights, turning conformity with criminal law, rather than with the Constitution, into the main criterion for admissibility.
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More specifically, telephone taps and recordings of face-to-face private conversations were admissible in court under the condition that they had not been obtained by the commission of a criminal offence. Article 370A of the Penal Code (PC) proscribed the covert recording of conversations between third parties, but, crucially, this provision did not extend to recordings made by one of the parties to the conversation. 16 As a result, when it was one of the parties that covertly recorded the conversation without the consent of the other(s), the recording was admissible, since no criminal offence had been committed. 17 Such recordings
were not barred by the Constitution either, after Arios Pagos held, in an important decision in 1969, that the right to secrecy of correspondence did not have horizontal effect; it limited the state only and did not apply to interference by private individuals.
18 within Hellenic constitutional doctrine. Some commentators argue that the Constitution itself dictates a balancing approach. 24 Nikolaos Androulakis noted, for example, that the 'revelation of truth in criminal trials as well as the discovery and punishment of crimes constitute principles of a constitutional nature'. 25 From this point of view, the pursuit of truth has a constitutional footing equal to that of individual rights enshrined in the Constitution. As a result-the argument goes-the conflict between the pursuit of truth and the protection of individual rights cannot be resolved ex ante and in abstracto, but only through a judicial balancing exercise in concreto.
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Yet this interpretation has a fundamental flaw, which Argirios Karras pinpointed with illuminating precision:
The balancing exercise has already been conducted by the constitutional legislator. Its outcome is reflected in the Constitution itself or in other statutes, which sanction-directly or indirectly-the relevant evidential prohibitions. Thus, when an evidential prohibition is instituted-either constitutionally or through simple statutory provisions-the legal order accepts that this prohibition may render more difficult, or even impossible, the efficient administration of criminal justice and the pursuit of truth, and yet it proceeds to the introduction of this prohibition, having obviously first balanced the competing values and chosen the protection of a particular legal value over the efficient administration of criminal justice and the pursuit of truth […] As a consequence, there can be no further balancing by the judge, otherwise the relevant provision [containing the evidential prohibition] is bypassed and the evidential prohibition is undermined […] If a judge retains the discretion to decide in each case whether illegally obtained evidence can be used, it is possible that fundamental provisions [protective of the defendant] will be completely overturned.
Karras's argument inevitably leads to automatic exclusion. It leaves no space for balancing and discretion, 28 striking a fatal blow to the 'theory of balancing'. Not everyone is persuaded by 'balancing' in any case. 29 Some commentators point to a serious risk of arbitrary decisions and lack of legal certainty as a result of balancing. 30 Considering these risks, even commentators adhering to balancing stress the importance of conducting the balancing exercise only in accordance with specific criteria, such as the seriousness of the crime, the gravity of the procedural violation, the reliability of the contested evidence, the need to protect the person who has been the victim of the procedural violation, the availability of other evidence or the possibility that the evidence in question could have been legally obtained. 31 Moreover, proportionality is seen as a key component of balancing. 32 In general, the view that only a structured discretion could achieve a compromise between flexibility and legal certainty is shared by supporters of the 'theory of balancing'. 33 Some of these commentators even maintain that certain rights cannot be subjected to balancing at all. 34 Others, however, reject balancing altogether, insisting that exclusion is inherent in certain constitutional rights. This was an absolute exclusionary rule that could 'guarantee more efficiently and ex ante the protection of privacy, without a balancing of competing interests by the court being necessary'. 40 In opting for such a radical solution, Parliament seemed determined to put an end to the use of illegally obtained tape-recordings in trials.
In applying this rule, Arios Pagos held that 'the use of an illegally recorded conversation caused nullity of the judgment', 41 requiring the defendant's conviction to be quashed. Surprisingly, however, this exclusionary rule was abolished in 1993, only two years after coming into effect. In its place, Parliament introduced a criminal defence condoning the use in court of covertly obtained recordings when intended to protect 'justified interests' of the parties (article 370A para. 4 PC 42 ). In so doing, Parliament reversed the position it had taken in 1991, and it looked like the end of the road for automatic exclusion.
However, Parliament's experimentations with the law of improperly obtained evidence continued through the 1990s. In 1996 article 177 para. 2 was inserted into the Code of Penal Procedure, mandating the exclusion of evidence obtained through the commission of a criminal offence. Most radically, in 2001 Parliament adopted article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution, expressly inserting an exclusionary rule into the constitutional text. Before examining these two provisions in detail, it is first necessary to describe the procedural context within which they function as an essential prelude to comparative analysis.
Excluding evidence in Continental unitary courts
The question of barring the fact-finder's access to improperly obtained evidence, while fundamental to Anglo-American law, is irrelevant to Continental jurisprudence. The division between bifurcated and unitary courts is crucial to understanding this difference of perspective. 43 In Continental unitary courts, the fact-finder is a professional judge who decides both the admissibility of evidence and the question of guilt. In this context, 'exclusion' of improperly obtained evidence simply means the fact-finder is obliged to ignore the tainted evidence when he decides on guilt; exclusion has little in common with insulating the fact-finder from accessing improperly obtained evidence. In Anglo-American trials the emphasis is placed on averting contamination of the fact-finding process by tainted evidence. More specifically, in Anglo-American bifurcated courts the trial judge decides the admissibility of evidence in a voir dire or pre-trial hearing and the jury determines guilt without accessing evidence that has been 'excluded' in the literal sense of the word.
There is no voir dire when parties seek to adduce evidence during the trial phase in Greece. Professional judges who finally determine the issue of guilt also decide the admissibility of evidence. A ruling that certain evidence is prohibited as a consequence of falling within the scope of an exclusionary rule simply means judges have to disregard such evidence when they reflect on the question of guilt. If they do base a finding of guilt on prohibited evidence, the conviction is null and void, and should be automatically quashed upon appellate review.
The question that inevitably arises is how realistic it is to expect that this duty to disregard improperly obtained evidence will prevent the fact-finder from relying on such evidence when deciding on guilt. Mirjan Damaška argued that 'where the same individuals decide the admissibility of evidence and the weight it deserves, the taint from the forbidden but persuasive information cannot be avoided: it always affects the decision maker's thinking'. 44 Exclusion under these circumstances 'easily produces an excursion into unreality', 45 so that 'the occasional identity in the wording of Continental and Anglo-American exclusionary rules can thus be deceptive'. 46 Damaška's analysis implies that, irrespective of how far-reaching they may appear to be, in reality Continental exclusionary rules offer only hollow protections. However, this criticism loses some of its force when one considers that Continental courts have to explain their findings through reasoned opinions. Since professional judges have to indicate the evidentiary basis for their findings of guilt, appellate courts are well equipped to check whether prohibited evidence has been relied upon. An efficient system of appellate review thus reduces the significance of procedural divergence between Anglo-American and Continental systems in relation to improperly obtained evidence. Having said that, the risk remains that the opinion may omit reference to evidence that judges have taken into account in spite of their duty to disregard. Referring specifically to the operation of exclusionary rules in Germany, Craig Bradley drew attention to cases where 'the suppressed evidence is not obviously necessary to support a finding of guilt but is in reality the dispositive factor in the minds of the fact finders'.
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On the other hand, this criticism applies only to situations where a party seeks to have evidence admitted during the trial phase where there has been no previous opportunity to challenge its admissibility. Continental procedure normally provides parties with the opportunity to contest the admissibility of evidence at the pre-trial phase, usually by an application to the judicial chamber responsible for supervising the pre-trial investigation. In Greece, judicial chambers of courts of first instance 48 have jurisdiction to nullify irregular procedural acts conducted during the pre-trial phase. 49 If an act is conducted in breach of procedural standards, the act is null and void, and consequently without any legal effect. 50 For example, if the judicial chamber finds that a police search has been conducted without the appropriate authorisation, the search will be pronounced null and void and any evidence discovered during that search will not be admissible. Since inadmissible evidence has to be suppressed from the investigation dossier, judicial chamber review during the pre-trial phase can be regarded as the equivalent of the Anglo-American voir dire or pre-trial hearing. 
Excluding improperly obtained evidence in Greece: legislation and jurisprudence
Greece has developed two separate doctrinal bases for excluding improperly obtained evidence in criminal trials. The first is located in the Code of Penal Procedure, whereas the second exclusionary jurisdiction is to be found in the text of the Constitution. This section examines the scope and rationale of each exclusionary rule, before turning to consider how these legislative provisions have been developed in practice by the courts. All in all, article 177 para. 2 is marked by considerable contradictions. It indicates that in 1996 Parliament wanted to take a radical step in the direction of automatic exclusion, but was also influenced by public interest considerations that would necessarily qualify the scope for exclusion. This resulted in a rule that generally puts rights first, but also provides for important exceptions, with the further potential for confusion and uncertainty.
The exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by the commission of criminal offences
The constitutional exclusionary rule for violations of the right to privacy
The 2001 revision of the Constitution revolved around the protection of individual rights, 72 with the right to privacy a notable area of significant developments. 73 In looking for ways to enforce this right, Parliament introduced article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution:
Use of evidence acquired in violation of the present article [article 19 para. 1] and of articles 9 and 9A is prohibited.
Articles 19 para. 1, 9 and 9A of the Constitution, respectively, protect the right to secrecy of correspondence, the sanctity of a person's home and inviolability of his private and family life, and place restriction on the use of his personal data. The use of evidence obtained in violation of any of these broadly-based privacy rights (privacy lato sensu) is now constitutionally prohibited. The exclusionary rule contained in article 19 para. 3 is an important innovation, when viewed in comparative perspective, since it simultaneously possesses the following three characteristics: it is constitutional, automatic and absolute.
First, the fact that the exclusionary rule is now part and parcel of the Constitution means that the rule has become 'fundamental law' (higher order law) and cannot be abolished by statute or other act of Government. 
Exclusion in practice: judicial developments
The use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy led Arios Pagos to quash a number of convictions from the mid 1990s onwards. 92 The turning point was in 2001 when, prior to the introduction of article 19 para. 3, Arios Pagos, in plenary, strongly condemned the use of such evidence. 93 The court read an evidential prohibition into the Constitution, as it had previously in cases of improperly seized letters. This decision set the tone for the case law that followed.
In a case in 2002 where the defendant had been convicted of bribery on the basis of a tape-recorded conversation, the conviction was quashed since it was not clear whether the recording had been lawfully obtained. 94 This case demonstrates that the defendant bears no burden of proof on this issue. Any doubts as ostensibly absolute exclusionary rule was seen by some commentators as going so far as to prohibit the use of unconstitutionally obtained exonerating evidence. 105 Nevertheless, Arios Pagos recently held, rightly in my view, that preventing a defendant from using evidence that could prove his innocence would violate the overarching constitutional right to respect of human dignity (article 2 para. 1 of the Constitution) and that courts should therefore admit exonerating evidence, albeit subject to certain conditions. More specifically, Arios Pagos mentioned a proportionality requirement, that the gravity of the offence should be taken into account and, most important, that the evidence in question should be the only exonerating evidence available to the defendant. 106 This decision demonstrates the need to balance the constitutional right to privacy with respect for human dignity in such cases.
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This balancing exercise is further complicated when the exonerating evidence that the defendant (D1) seeks to adduce has been obtained by violating the right to privacy of a co-defendant (D2), for example when D1 has covertly recorded a conversation with D2, which is exonerating for D1 but inculpates D2. Arios Pagos indicates that such evidence is admissible: the fact-finder should take the exonerating part into account when deciding on D1's guilt, but must then disregard the incriminatory part when deciding on D2's guilt. 107 However, D1 still has to argue that the evidence he seeks to adduce is the only exonerating evidence available to him. 108 This jurisprudence effects a delicate compromise between respecting D1's right to human dignity, which would be seriously undermined if he were wrongly convicted as a result of not being able to adduce exonerating evidence, and D2's right to privacy, which would be equally damaged if evidence obtained in breach of the relevant constitutional protection were admitted. Whether the fact-finder can realistically be expected to disregard the incriminating part of the evidence once he becomes aware of it is another question, which in these circumstances cannot be addressed through suppression of the evidence. This is a rare example of an exception to evidentiary exclusion inspired by the need to safeguard the rights of the defendant. It contrasts with other Arios Pagos jurisprudence tending to undermine the protective effect of article 177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure and article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution. In a 2001
case, 109 a video camera had been covertly installed in church premises where money and other items dedicated to the church were kept. A priest was charged with theft and 15 videotapes were submitted to court showing him stealing the money. In a similar case decided in 2004, a video camera had been secretly installed in a shop. Twenty-eight video stills were produced in court showing an employee committing theft. 110 In both cases, Arios Pagos concentrated on whether the evidence had been obtained by the commission of the offence of 'improperly recording non-public acts' (article 370A para. 2 PC). It gave a negative answer to this question: the relevant acts were not non-public (private) since they were conducted 'in the context of administrative duties [which were] subject to public control and public criticism'. 111 Article 177 para. 2 consequently did not apply and use of the recordings was lawful.
These decisions have rightly been criticised for putting forward a restrictive interpretation of the notion of private life. 112 Their effect is that conduct related to occupational activities falls outside the protective scope of the right to privacy, irrespective of whether such conduct can be regarded as 'private' in a wider sense. 113 This may be an example of inflexible exclusionary rules leading to narrow interpretations of the constitutional rights they are supposed to protect, calling to mind an important criticism of automatic exclusion. 114 One might respond by pointing out that inflexible exclusionary rules oblige the courts to reflect openly on the extent of constitutional limits, rather than, hypocritically, subscribing to constitutional rights rhetoric while validating the use of evidence obtained in violation of these very rights under a discretionary admissibility regime.
Finally, it can be argued that groundbreaking though it may be in theory, article 19 para. 3 has not yet had the dramatic impact in practice one would have expected to see. In fact, courts have blatantly ignored it in some cases, applying
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article 177 para. 2 instead. 115 In addition, there is obiter dicta to the effect that the 'life imprisonment offences' exception of article 177 para. 2 remains valid. 116 However, this exception is incompatible with article 19 para. 3 and should be abolished. 117 More specifically, the starting point should be that article 19 para. 3 prevails over any conflicting statutory provision. When dealing with violations of the right to privacy, courts should apply article 19 para. 3 directly rather than resort to article 177 para. 2. Post 2001, the Constitution itself prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy, independently of whether that violation also constitutes a criminal offence.
Improperly obtained evidence in England and Wales: discretionary exclusion and stays of the proceedings for abuse of process
English law on improperly obtained evidence is notoriously difficult to decipher. Its discretionary nature leads to inconsistent case law and lack of legal certainty. 118 Yet, it is well documented in relation to discretionary exclusion under s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 that reliability considerations reign supreme 119 and that protection of rights is peripheral to pursuing accurate fact-finding. 120 Nowhere is this more evident than regarding evidence obtained in violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to respect for private life, home and correspondence. 121 Recent case law illustrates that, in spite of the 'incorporation' of the Convention, such evidence is readily admitted on the basis of its strength and cogency. 122 This has sparked some criticism and proposals for reform, ranging from moving to a structured discretion 123 to introducing a presumption of exclusion for specified rights, 124 even a strong presumption that 'should be able to be rebutted only by compelling considerations in favour of the evidence being admitted'. 125 However, commentators have stopped short of advocating automatic exclusion, since this is considered too radical an option with no realistic prospect of being adopted by English courts. 126 In addition, scant support for this approach can be derived from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has held that evidence obtained in violation of Article 8 does not necessarily violate the right to a fair trial. 127 Nor does it appear likely that automatic exclusion will gain significant ground in the near future, given the general trend within the English law of evidence to 'move away from mandatory precepts and detailed technicalities in the direction of structured discretion and more flexible norms'.
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The English law on improperly obtained evidence is to a considerable extent marked by a one-dimensional preoccupation with the pursuit of truth (intrinsic policy considerations). 129 It seems more in tune with 'crime control' than 'due process' values 130 and appears to rest on a consequentialist basis that allows rights considerations to be sidestepped in pursuit of accurate fact-finding and the
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conviction of the guilty. 131 In marked contrast, an approach much more compatible with excluding evidence on 'broader considerations of the integrity of the criminal justice system' 132 (extrinsic policy considerations) is taken in the field of abuse of process. Andrew Choo and Susan Nash have observed that 'the narrowness of the discretion to exclude an item of "tainted" prosecution evidence stands uneasily alongside the width of the discretion to discontinue a "tainted" prosecution'. 133 Interestingly, the gap between the two doctrines may now be closing. The particular strength of Greece's protective principle merits emphasis. Ashworth has spoken of a qualified protective principle and of a prima facie justification for exclusion. 149 He argued that the protective principle would be better linked with an exclusionary discretion 150 and conceived its operation as largely dependent upon the evidentiary impact of the rights violation in question. Thus, evidence should be excluded, 'unless the court is satisfied that the accused in fact suffered no disadvantage as a result of the breach'. 151 By contrast, exclusion in Greece is not dependent upon such 'post hoc rationalization of events'. 152 There is no in concreto review aimed at discovering whether the accused has actually been disadvantaged as a result of a constitutional violation. Exclusion is rather seen as a means to vindicate constitutional rights in abstracto. 153 Secondly, automatic exclusion in Greece can be seen as a counterweight to the predominance of discretionary approaches in the common law world. This counterweight role has traditionally been reserved for the exclusionary rules derived from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the US Constitution. However, relentless judicial undermining of the American exclusionary rule since the 1970s-including the recognition of deterrence-based exceptions to automatic exclusion 154 Another salient feature of automatic exclusion in Greece is its unusually wide scope. As demonstrated above, the exclusionary rules apply to both illegally and unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 155 They apply at all stages of criminal proceedings 156 both to evidence directly tainted by the improper manner in which it was obtained and to derivative evidence, whoever was responsible for obtaining the evidence (state officials or private individuals) and regardless of whose rights were infringed (defendant or third parties). Such a distinctive approach to regulating improperly obtained evidence should not be overlooked when weighing competing evidentiary regimes in the comparative balance.
privacy' until recently. 159 This may explain why there is so much emphasis on privacy violations in Greece and why automatic exclusion has become the favoured remedy, whereas privacy violations rank only as one factor among others in the context of discretionary exclusion in England and Wales.
Bitter, and not-too-distant, experience of rule by military junta in Greece is another factor influencing a robust approach towards violations of civil liberties, and the right to privacy in particular. Mirjan Damaška's general observation finds ample confirmation in the case of Greece:
In the aftermath of the traumatic totalitarian experience, the sensitivity to values such as human dignity, or privacy, has impelled most continental jurisdictions to accept the idea that probative material should be rejected when obtained in violation of certain human rights. 160 Automatic exclusion for violations of the right to privacy must also be seen in the context of the procedural framework within which this doctrine was developed in Greece. Hellenic criminal procedure is 'applied constitutional law', 161 demanding that the protection of constitutional rights within the criminal process takes priority over countervailing public interests. 162 In other words, criminal law doctrines develop within a culture of constitutional rights, and probably as a result of it. The development of automatic evidentiary exclusion in Greece, culminating in a constitutional exclusionary rule for violations of the right to privacy, is one manifestation of this phenomenon. This development occurred despite criminal law scholarship strongly advocating a balancing approach.
The basis in the Constitution of both automatic exclusion and the protective principle approach in Greece should be of particular significance for England and Wales, given the 'looming constitutionalization of English criminal procedure law' 163 under the European Convention umbrella. Regardless of its short-term impact, 164 the European Convention on Human Rights will probably strengthen the incipient quasi-constitutional procedural culture in England in the long run, eventually producing a more hospitable jurisprudential climate for the protective principle, if not the adoption of automatic exclusion. 165 This would be all the more likely if the European Court were to abandon its current position and embrace the view that admitting evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy conflicts with the right to a fair trial. 166 At the same time it must be acknowledged that the Hellenic example also lends support to more sceptical views. Critics of the protective principle might point to the risk that inflexible exclusionary rules lead courts to interpret the Constitution too narrowly or pay only lip-service to evidentiary provisions. Critics might also stress that Greece abandoned the rights-centred approach in the context of serious criminality (anyway limited to evidence obtained by the commission of criminal offences) and that the Hellenic exclusionary rules focus exclusively on surreptitiously recorded private conversations. The admissibility of other tangible evidence, even in the context of privacy violations-e.g. improperly obtained DNA evidence or real evidence obtained by unauthorised police searches-has very rarely troubled the courts in the past. In addition, it is nearly always the 'civil party' rather than the prosecution that submits the contested evidence. Prosecution authorities are perhaps unwilling to risk compromising their surveillance methods or the identities of their sources by adducing covertly-recorded conversations at a public trial, considering that intercepted communications can still be useful intelligence leading towards alternative sources of evidence. 167 Critics would therefore be right to insist that the Hellenic exclusionary model has its limitations with regard to constitutional rights protection.
The more fundamental objection that Continental criminal procedure presents only an 'exclusionary illusion', as a result of the fact-finder's access to 'excluded' evidence, has already been exposed as an exaggeration. 168 More generally, the sceptic might contend that the significance of evidentiary exclusion is muted in Continental jurisdictions, where the fact-finder has access to more information than is typically the case in common law trials, including hearsay and bad character evidence, 169 and scrupulously examines the defendant and other witnesses in court. 170 The Continental fact-finder works on the basis of an 'investigation dossier' providing him with the fruits of an extensive pre-trial 'official inquiry' conducted by a powerful 'investigating judge'. In his single-minded pursuit of truth the Continental fact-finder can count on the assistance not only of a powerful prosecutor, but also of a 'civil party' determined to assist in the conviction of the defendant. In this light, the sceptic might conclude that in a Continental setting the fact-finder has sufficient means to pursue the truth even when important incriminating evidence has been excluded. This might explain the progressive approach to evidentiary exclusion encountered in some Continental systems.
In response it should be emphasised that the scope for exclusion is much wider in Greece than in Anglo-American legal systems, and the impact on truth-finding is therefore potentially much more significant. The absence of 'alternative' procedures in Greece-most notably bargained guilty pleas-results in many more trials where exclusionary rules apply. 171 It cannot therefore be said that exclusionary rules in Greece impose no costs in terms of convictions being quashed. Greece has adopted mandatory exclusionary rules in spite of their potentially considerable 'exclusionary toll', and against the background of a Continental criminal procedure committed to the principle of free proof and traditionally hostile towards evidentiary barriers to conviction. 172 Viewed from this angle, Greece's endorsement of a stringent exclusionary approach to improperly obtained evidence reflects a conscious political choice.
Greece made this choice under the influence of a culture of constitutional rights and despite countervailing practical considerations. For example, close judicial supervision of criminal investigations in Greece 173 reduces the need for ex post facto vindication of defendants' rights through exclusionary rules. Judicial supervision can provide defendants, in theory at least, with sufficient protection ex ante. In addition, the existence of a centralised police force under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Order means there is no need for exclusionary rules to lead, through relevant case law, to standardisation of police practices. 174 Such practices are more or less taken for granted in Continental countries like Greece, where the police force is bureaucratically organised and its activities are governed by a Code of Penal Procedure.
Conclusions
Considering that 'modern law's cosmopolitan tendencies [can open] up new vistas of possibility for Evidence teaching and scholarship', 175 attention to Hellenic law might be enriching in many ways for the debate on improperly obtained evidence in Anglo-American legal systems. First of all, it reveals that the exclusionary rule is not idiomatic to Anglo-American law. 176 In particular, Greece possesses significant automatic exclusionary rules, which can also be found in other Continental jurisdictions. 177 This article also equips common law scholars with a detailed illustration of a legal system where the protective principle has been explicitly endorsed and implemented in practice. Hellenic law demonstrates that a rights-centred approach to improperly obtained evidence may be a realistic option for some countries. In the case of Greece, it was a realistic option for a country with a strongly liberal Constitution and a rights-centred approach to criminal process values.
Analogies with Greece must be taken for what they are worth, however, especially in terms of legal reform. After all, '[t]he decision to endorse a particular approach to the exclusionary rule […] is partly a political choice'. 178 Independently of whether the law develops under the influence of a liberal Constitution-be that in a common law or Continental law procedural setting-adopting a particular approach to the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence will always come down to a difficult balance between the protection of rights and the efficient investigation of crime. In that respect, Greece offers the interesting example of a country which has taken the unreserved political decision that constitutional rights come first.
